The theory of industrial organization / Jean Tirole
SYSNO 6412637, přírůstkové číslo 6761

Seznam obrázků v dokumentu:
Figure 1 – Consumer surplus.
Figure 2 – Dead-weight loss from commodity taxation.
Figure 3 – Compensating and equivalent variations and consumer surplus.
Figure 1 – An example of unitary-form organization. Source: Williamson 1975, p. 134.
Figure 2 shows three shapes of average-cost (AC) and marginal-cost (MC) curves that are familiar from introductory and intermediate microeconomics textbooks.
Figure 3 "The shareholders’ profit is lower under unobservability – equation 4’ and the concavity of u imply that the expected wage bill, xw2 +(1 -x)w1, strictly exceeds w0 +Φ, as figure 3 shows."
Figure 4 "This brings us to an interesting class of hierarchical models which were pioneered by William-son (1967) and by Calvo and Wellisz (1978, 1979) and developed further by Rosen (1982) and by Keren and Levhari (1983). "
Figure 5 – An example of the multidivisional form. Source: Williamson 1975, p. 138.
Figure 1.1 "In figure 1.1 this surplus is represented by the area DGAD under marginal-cost pricing and by the area DEFAD under monopoly pricing."
Figure 2.1 – The linear city.
Figure 2.2 – a, b, c, d
Figure 2.3 – Demand curve with goodwill.
Figure 3.1 "Imagine first that the monopolist adopts the competitive pricing schedule, i.e., T(q) =pcq, where pc is the competitive price (see figure 3.1). Let Sc be the corresponding net consumer surplus"
Figure 3.2 "A well-known property of a convex function is that it is everywhere above its tangents, as figure 3.2 shows"
Figure 3.3 "To accomplish this, the monopolist can buy a firm in industry 2, then set this firm’s final price at p2*, and sell the intermediate good at price p1* to other firms (see figure 3.3)."
Figure 3.4 "(Note that Si(θi) =0, and that the surplus is always higher for θ2 types.) The demand curves and the net surpluses are depicted in figure 3.4."
Figure 3.5 – A two-part tariff.
Figure 3.6 "Figure 3.6, which depicts the (q, T) space, explains why. "
Figure 3.7 "But dq /dθ >0, and, from equation 3.15, dp /dθ <0. Hence, the payment function is concave. It is represented in figure 3.7."
Figure 3.8 "This policy is indeed profitable, because a reduction in services is relatively less costly to the low- risk than to the high-risk consumers"
Figure 3.9 "Assuming for simplicity a constant marginal cost c and a single consumer, the optimal two-part tariff is p =c and A =∫(qc, 0)[P̃(q) -c]dq. "
Figure 3.10 "Suppose that the monopolist offers, along with the linear tariff T(q) =pq, the two-part tariff T̃(q) =Ã +p̃q, where c <p̃ <p and pD2(p) =Ã +p̃D2(p)."
Figure 4.1 "A linear price is a contract specifying only a payment, T(q) =pwq, from the retailer to the manufacturer, q is the retailer’s choice "
Figure 4.2 – Exclusive territories.
Figure 4.3 – Example of a tie-in.
Figure 4.4 – Double marginalization.
Figure 4.5 "If (as in figure 4.5) one of the two firms is competitive in the sense that it sells at mar-ginal cost, then vertical integration does not increase the profit of the monopoly firm. "
Figure 4.6 "Obtaining the basic externality does not require the monopolization of the downstream indus-try when there are several inputs. The differences introduced by downstream competition will be discussed below."
Figure 4.7 – Vertical intergration with several inputs.
Figure 4.8 – Tie-in.
Figure 1 Price - Product choice - Determination of cost and capacity - Research and development
Figure 2: Strategic substitutes (Πiji <0). Strategic complements (Πiji >0)
Figure 5.1. Constant returns to scale. Decreasing returns to scale. Capacity constraint.
Figure 5.2. The efficient-rationing rule.
Figure 5.3. The proportional-rationing rule.
Figure 5.4 "Price competition under constant returns to scale yields a price equal to the constant marginal cost. "
Figure 5.5 "The equilibrium quantities are depicted in figure 5.5 by the intersection of the two reaction curves."
Figure 5.6. Effect of an increase in firm I’s marginal cost.
Figure 5.7 "These conditions, as well as the strict concavity of the profit functions with respect to own output, are satisfied for linear demand and constant marginal costs as long as the latter are „not too high.“ The existence can be obtained from figure 5.7"
Figure 5.8 – Jumps down and nonexistence, Jumps up and existence
Figure 5.9 – Multiple Cournot equilibrium.
Figure 5.10 "Suppose that in the original economy each firm has a U-shaped average-cost curve C(q) /q, as in figure 5.10. "
Figure 5.11 "Figure 5.11 gives the intuition for the result in the case of a continuously increasing marginal cost. "
Figure 5.12 "Above either reaction curve, the only possible equilibrium is a „mixed-strategy“ one "
Figure 5.13 illustrates the reaction curves when the capacity cost is sunk and when it is not.
Figure 6.1 – Reaction function for kinked demand curve.
Figure 6.2 – Kinked demand curve.
Figure 6.3 – The Folk theorem for the repeated price game.
Figure 6.4 depicts the so-called „prisoner’s dilemma“ game 
Figure 6.5 – Bertrand competition, Cournot competition
Figure 6.6 constituent game (game of coordination) 
Figure 6.7 - Price-market share relation, (Constrained) Pareto frontier
Efficient market-sharing allocations.
Figure 7.1 "Those firms do not choose their location, but rather are automatically located equidistant from one another on the circle "
Figure 7.2 "Suppose that it chooses price pi (see figure 7.2). A consumer located at the distance x be-longs to (0,1 /n) from firm i is indifferent between purchasing from firm i and purchasing from i’s closest neighbor if..."
Figure 7.3 "A free-entry equilibrium requires that each firm make zero profit or, simply, that firm i pro-duce at a point (pic, qic) such that the residual demand curve is tangent to the average-cost curve at this point"
Figure 7.4 – Demand curve for perfectly substitutable goods.
Figure 7.5 – Generalized costs under quadratic transportation costs.
Figure 8.1 depicts the unique sustainable configuration in this industry
Figure 8.2 – Price dynamics in natural monopoly.
Figure 8.3 – Stackelberg outcome.
Figure 8.4 "An oft-quoted example is that of two armies wishing to occupy an island located between their countries and connected by a bridge to both"
Figure 8.5 – A fixed cost of entry implies a minimum capital level.
Figure 8.6 – Short-run marginal cost.
Figure 8.7 – Short-run and long-run reaction functions.
Figure 8.8 – Stable second-period equilibrium.
Figure 8.9 – A firm’s reaction curve moves outward with a decrease in marginal cost.
Figure 8.10 – Optimal business strategies. (A stands for accommodation of entry, D for deterrence.)
Figure 8.11 – Stackelberg price leadership.
Figure 8.12 – Second-period reaction curves when firm 1 offers price protection at p1
Figure 8.13 (bez popisku)
Figure 8.14 (bez popisku)
Figure 8.15 – Incumbent’s equilibrium investment strategy.
Figure 8.16 (bez popisku)
Figure 8.17 (bez popisku)
Figure 8.18 (bez popisku)
Figure 8.19 (bez popisku) 
Figure 8.20 (bez popisku)
Figure 8.21 (bez popisku)
Figure 8.22 (bez popisku)
Figure 8.23 (bez popisku)
Figure 9.1 (bez popisku)
Figure 9.2 (bez popisku)
Figure 9.3 – Selection in a war of attrition, (a) Stationary payoffs: infinite selection, (b) Nonstationary payoffs: possibility of finite selection.
Figure 10.1 – Leader’s and follower’s payoffs – Preemption and diffusion. The leader s payoff is L(t) =[V -C(t)]e-rt: the follower’s is F(t) =0.
Figure 10.2 – A bandwagon situation in network externalities.
Figure 10.3 (bez popisku)
Figure 11.1 – Game 1.
Figure 11.2 – Game 2.
Figure 11.3 – Normal form.
Figure 11.4 – Game 3.
Figure 11.5 – The prisoner’s dilemma.
Figure 11.6 (bez popisku)
Figure 11.6 (bez popisku)
Figure 11.7 (bez popisku)
Figure 11.8 (bez popisku)
Figure 11.8 (bez popisku)
Figure 11.9 – A game of „grab the dollar.“
Figure 11.10 – Game 5.
Figure 11.11 – Game 6.
Figure 11.12 (bez popisku)
Figure 11.13 (bez popisku)