The 2017 French presidential elections: a political reformation? / Jocelyn Evans and Gilles Ivaldi
SYSNO 6490128, příůstkové číslo 7559

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Fig. 1.1 Presidential candidate contenders and voters’ views of their link to political renewal (January 2017).
Fig. 1.2 Trends in first-round presidential and legislative turnout (1958–2017) and in trust in political parties (2000–2017).
Fig. 2.1 Comparative pre-election presidential popularities (2012–2017).
Fig. 2.2 Public opinion trust of the left and the right (2009–2016).
Fig. 2.3 Dissatisfaction with democracy in France (2009–2016).
Fig. 2.4 Polarization as the total size of the radical vote in presidential elections (1965–2017). Source: Ministry of Interior official figures, in per cent of the valid vote cast; authors’ calculations
Fig. 2.5 Effective number of candidates in presidential elections since 1965. Source: Ministry of the Interior official results; authors’ own calculations
Fig. 2.6 Voter turnout and fragmentation of candidate supply in French presidential elections since 1965. Source: Ministry of the Interior official results; fragmentation is expressed as the effective number of candidates (see above); authors’ calculations
Fig. 3.1 Post-primary popularity bounce for Fillon (LR) and Hamon (PS). Note: TNS-SOFRES monthly popularity data; per cent of respondents who say they ‘want Fillon / Hamon to play an important role in the future’.
Fig. 4.1 Emmanuel Macron’s popularity scores (2014–2017). Note: TNS-SOFRES monthly popularity data; per cent of respondents who say they ‘want Macron to play a more important role in the future’ (2014–2017).
Fig. 5.1 Voter support for France’s membership of the EU, by presidential vote. Source: SCoRE survey
Fig. 5.2 Voter support for France leaving the EU and leaving the euro, by presidential vote. Source: SCoRE survey
Fig. 5.3 Trends in presidential voting intentions for François Fillon (November 2016–April 2017). Note: loess regression fitted curve (bandwidth = 0.4).
Fig. 5.4 François Hollande popularity ratings around the time of the Paris attacks. Source: Kantar-TNS political popularity trends
Fig. 6.1 Vote intention polling for the primaires citoyennes (Left) primaries.
Fig. 6.2 Vote intention polling fir the centre/right primaries.
Fig. 6.3 Vote intention polling for the presidential first round.
Fig. 6.4 Vote intention polling for the presidential second round.
Fig. 6.5 Trends in polling accuracy for first-round presidential election polls. Note: Vertical line indicates 18 March 2017 (publication of official list of candidates). Source: As Fig. 6.3
Fig. 6.6 Vote intention polling for the legislative first round.
Fig. 7.1 Candidate competence and capacity to embody change in the first round of the 2017 presidential election. Note: Horizontal axis = per cent saying candidate is capable of governing the country; vertical axis = per cent saying candidate embodies change. Candidate location is relative and expressed as a deviation from the mean of all scores.
Fig. 7.2 Distribution of left-right positions for Fillon and Le Pen voters. Note: 11-point scale (1–radical left; 11–radical right). Source: SCoRE survey
Fig. 8.1 Distribution of left-right position for Le Pen and Macron voters. Note: 11-point scale (1–radical left; 11–radical right). Source: SCoRE survey
Fig. 8.2 Fitted probability of Macron vote by position on EU dimension. Note: Probabilities derived from binary logit model, holding other variables at their mean or proportions. 95 per cent confidence intervals reported. Source: SCoRE survey
Fig. 8.3 Mean positions of second-round vote choices for Fillon and Mélenchon first-round voters on attitudinal items. Note: all positions calculated on standardized attitudes, negative values corresponding to lower values of unstandardized variables. Source: SCoRE survey